I recommend QUIK SMS as an maintained fork of QKSMS. https://www.f-droid.org/en/packages/dev.octoshrimpy.quik/

Firefox isn't FOSS. It requires proprietary APIs like Google Safe browsing and others. See the Fennec's deblobbing scripts and build repo for a more details: https://gitlab.com/relan/fennecbuild

I think the point isn't that the scrapper is NOT going to record their messages, but instead that it WILL regardless. Then making use of a training data unmasking exploit, the company (theoretical if the law sides with the individual) needs to fully retrain their model to remove the message text. This puts a lot if faith in copyright law, which is strong in the USA (and others) but rarely enforced to the benefit of small creators. Very little legal precedent.

It can access the encrypted data and any unencrypted startup software that hands things off to the OS after decryption.

Anti-fingerprinting isn't as simple as blocking JavaScript. There are dozens of other parameters. You can fingerprint with pure CSS. When I say anti-fingerprinting is necessary for a crowd, I am referring to data normalization. Like Firefox's Resistant Fingerprinting and letterboxing. I find most of RFP's effects unobtrusive, but it always for a crowd to form in specialized cases. Only Tor browser and Mullvad can reasonably form a crowd.
I dont know what you mean by privacy projects spreading dirty JS. I recommend you read up on actual anti-fingerprinting techniques. Your knowledge of anti/fingerprinting seems limited. Basic anti-fingerprinting is necessary on the modern web, same thing with a content blocker. Security and privacy sometimes come at the cost of convenience, but not always.

Jesus. Kinda overkill depending on how many parameters the model is and the float precision

It injects JavaScript and CSS. Any modifications to the webpage DOM are easily fingerprintable and therefore making it easy to distinguish you from other Tor users.

If Tor is blocked try using a RedLib instance: https://github.com/redlib-org/redlib-instances/blob/main/instances.md

My possible solution for you:

1. Visit CreepJS ( https://abrahamjuliot.github.io/creepjs/ ) and calculate your fuzzy fingerprint. Copy-paste that somewhere for later. This step is important so you can verify afterwords that your fingerprint stayed the same (the fingerprint of all other Tor browser users on your release version).

2. Install redirector ( https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/redirector/ ).

3. Look at the list of public RedLib instances and find ones that are dark mode by default. Then create a config in Redirector to redirect links when you visit reddit.com

4. Visit creepJS and verify that your fingerprint is the same.

If it isn't too bothersome, I recommend not install any extension because there may be some way to distinguish you even if your reported fingerprint doesn't change on creepJS.

You shouldn't normally turn into a frog when sitting on the toilet. Surely not many such cases ...

Neat, thanks random internet autistic. I appreciate you.

I read your source and am not convinced. While I do agree that piling on modifications is often fruitless and counterintuitive, Vanadium doesn't have the Fingerprinting protection necessary to create a crowd. At best it can create many islands of crowd for each physical device graphene supports, for each version of the software installed, and only assuming all other method of fingerprinting don't work (for some reason theoretically for the sake of this best case scenario). Read cromite's patch list to see some of the changes needed to produce basic anti-fingerprinting (still not good enough to create a crowd).

Your system webview is for in app usage. You aren't browsing the web using your system webview (generally). You can't blend into a crowd if you have no anti-fingerprinting. Firefox does this through RFP by normalizing settings between users, and on mobile there is partial support for screen size normalization through letterboxing. Vanadium isn't special, it is hardened chromium with some specific patches. You cannot form a crowd without special a lot of anti-fingerprint patching. See my other comment for details.

Firefox is missing per-site process isolation. This is theoretical an attack vector in the presence of multiple other major vulnerabilities. It has never been shown to be an attack vector in real world vulnerabilities. Don't call Firefox's sandboxing crap if you don't know why people have said that.

You can't blend in with a crowd of vanadium users with the amount of data points given away by the browser. Your fingerprint will be decernable from other users. Without actual anti-fingerprinting, which theoretical can allow for a crowd only when fingerprinting of user browsers results in the same fingerprint ID, the best you can hope to do is thwart naive fingerprinting. Vanadium doesn't have any anti-fingerprint built in, so the slightest differences between user can be used to easily fingerprint. Vanadium also has no strong method of in browser content blocking (eg an adblocker like uBlock) which is required on the modern web to remove JS tracking scripts (or straight allow and deny lists for specific web contents). Adblock is cyber security: https://www.ic3.gov/Media/Y2022/PSA221221

Examples of metrics include, but are not limited to, the following: Timezone, system and browser fonts (often automatically fetched by websites as a remote font that is cached by the browser), language, screen metrics (DPI, height x width, refresh rate, pixel ratio), canvas, CSS fingerprint, useragent, browsing mode (standard/private), video autoplay policy, audio device fingerprinting, installed plugins, cookie policy, device theme, and of course IP.

As a graphene OS vanadium user, assuming that the browser stays default, you would still have screen, audio, other hardware metrics, canvas (this one is a killer), IP, user agent (differences in installed versions of plugins and vanadium itself), timezone, remote Fonts, and others. Fingerprinting is an insane science which needs actual protection against to even begin hoping to create a crowd.

See some more details below.

Info on fingerprinting (about choosing a desktop browser but still relevant info): https://www.privacyguides.org/en/desktop-browsers

Browser comparison: https://divestos.org/pages/browsers

Fingerprinting test site: https://abrahamjuliot.github.io/creepjs/

Dont use system webview as your default browser. Webview is used by apps, your browser can and should be changed if privacy is your goal. Vanadium may be hardened, but it lacks any fingerprinting protection.

Standard for this old meme text format.

Vanadium doesn't have good/any fingerprinting protection. Cromite or Mull would be better, Tor would be best.

Lol

And then agree with whatever you said, even if it was wrong.

QEMU is so good though

Each are data points that together contribute to your total fingerprint. TZP tells you a lot of these data points, and fails ones that dont match Firefox Resistant Fingerprint masked data. Creepjs does much of the same but without gearing towards Firefox.

Generally fingerprintable things include:

Do not track signal.
Private browsing mode.
Timezone.
Useragent.
Canvas noise.
Installed fonts.
Font sizes.
Browser built-in plugins.
Some extensions.
WebRTC.
Theme.
Cookies.
IP address.
Local IPs (website can execute an ip scan and fingerprint).
Window viewport size.
Full screen mode viewport sizing.
Page/font color settings.
Operating System (impossible to mask because of differences in rendering on platforms).
Browser App name & icon. System TTS synthesis engine.
DOM modification fingerprinting (like that used by many extensions). Mouse speed.
Keyboard behavior.
Stylometric fingerprinting.
And many more.

For Firefox based browsers: https://arkenfox.github.io/TZP/tzp.html

For all browsers (more generalist): https://abrahamjuliot.github.io/creepjs/