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What's your take on biometric security?

A thief flags you down, grabs your phone and makes you unlock it using your thumb.

A cop opens the cop car door, grabs your hand and unlocks your phone, or even easier, face unlock.

Granted, guns and torture are rather effective as well, but is anyone entirely against fingerprint unlocking?

42 comments
  • if biometrics is the only thing you have you might aswell not have a password at all but if you use it with a 2fa pin it is good for example for your phone yiu can have a long backup passphrase and if you dont want to type that in you can use biometrics to unlock the pin screeb and still need to type in a pin so its the best of both worlds

  • If I can't change it once it gets breached (because it will get breached), then it's not security, it's a hurdle at best. Biometrics entry isn't security; it's convenience.

  • Graphene allows for fingerprint and second factor pin unlock, which is what I use. I mostly do that for cops, though, since in the US you can be legally compelled to unlock your phone with biometrics but not pin.

    Wouldn't stop someone from torturing you to unlock your device, but that's what a duress pin is for ;) (they may kill you once your phone wipes but at least they wouldn't have your data)

  • Police officers cannot force you to unlock your phone by a testimonial act that reveals the contents of your mind. You can be forced to unlock your phone by a nontestimonial act.

    From here...

    If only for the above reason, I refuse biometrics on any of my devices. 🤷‍♂️

  • Biometric anything feels weird, being an identical twin. I stick to never using it.

  • GrapheneOS allows it to not be used as the device unlock, but still use it for other apps once unlocked (such as banking apps).

    Device unlock should never be biometric.

    I also have data over the usb port disabled unless the device is actively unlocked.

  • For proper user authentication the model always used to be that the user should present three things: something they were (a username for instance), something they knew (a password), and something they had (a OTP from a device, or a biometric). The idea being that, even if a remote attacker got hold of the username and password, they didn't have the final factor, and if the user was incapacitated or otherwise forced to provide a biometric, they wouldn't necessarily supply the password (or on really secure systems, they'd use a 'panic' password that would appear to work, but hide sensitive information and send an alert to the security team).

    Now we seem to be rushing into a system where you have only two factors, the thing you have, namely your phone, and the other thing you have, namely a fingerprint or your face. Notably you can't really change either of those, especially your biometrics, so they're entirely useless for security. Instead your phone should require a biometric and a password to unlock. The biometric being 'the thing you are', the phone 'the thing you have', and the password being 'the thing you know.

    So, yes, I'm entirely against fingerprint unlocking.

  • The thumbprint and facescan reader on my phone straight up says that it's not necessarily good enough to distinguish me from family members (especially if we look similar, which we do) when you go to set it up, so I've pretty much never used either.

42 comments