Bulletins and News Discussion from December 2nd to December 8th, 2024 - May A Hundred Hazel Flowers Bloom - COTW: Russia
Image is of one of the six salvos of the Oreshnik missile striking Ukraine.
The Oreshnik is an intermediate-range ballistic missile that appears to split into six groups of six submunitions as it strikes its target, giving it the appearance of a hazel flower. It can travel at ten times the speed of sound, and cannot be intercepted by any known Western air defense system, and thus Russia can strike and conventionally destroy any target anywhere in Europe within 20 minutes. Two weeks ago, Russia used the Oreshnik to strike the Yuzhmash factory in Ukraine, particularly its underground facilities, in which ballistic missiles are produced.
Despite the destruction caused by the missile, and its demonstration of Russian missile supremacy over the imperial core, various warmongering Western countries have advocated for further reprisals against Russia, with Ukraine authorized by the US to continue strikes. Additionally, the recent upsurge of the fighting in Syria is no doubt connected to trying to stretch Russia thin, as well as attempting to isolate Hezbollah and Palestine from Iran; how successful this will have ended up being will depend on the outcome of the Russia and Syrian counteroffensive. Looking at recent military history, it will take many months for the Russians and Syrians to retake a city that was lost in about 48 hours.
Even in the worst case scenario for Hezbollah, it's notable that Ansarallah has had major success despite being physically cut off from the rest of the Resistance and under a blockade, and it has defeated the US Navy in its attempts to open up the strait. Israel has confirmed now that their army cannot even make significant territorial gains versus a post-Nasrallah, post-pager terrorist attack Hezbollah holding back its missile strike capabilities. In 2006, it also could not defeat a much less well-armed Hezbollah and was forced to retreat from Lebanon.
Defense Politics Asia's youtube channel and their map. Their youtube channel has substantially diminished in quality but the map is still useful. Moon of Alabama, which tends to have interesting analysis. Avoid the comment section. Understanding War and the Saker: reactionary sources that have occasional insights on the war. Alexander Mercouris, who does daily videos on the conflict. While he is a reactionary and surrounds himself with likeminded people, his daily update videos are relatively brainworm-free and good if you don't want to follow Russian telegram channels to get news. He also co-hosts The Duran, which is more explicitly conservative, racist, sexist, transphobic, anti-communist, etc when guests are invited on, but is just about tolerable when it's just the two of them if you want a little more analysis. Simplicius, who publishes on Substack. Like others, his political analysis should be soundly ignored, but his knowledge of weaponry and military strategy is generally quite good.
On the ground: Patrick Lancaster, an independent and very good journalist reporting in the warzone on the separatists' side.
Unedited videos of Russian/Ukrainian press conferences and speeches.
Pro-Russian Telegram Channels:
Again, CW for anti-LGBT and racist, sexist, etc speech, as well as combat footage.
https://t.me/aleksandr_skif ~ DPR's former Defense Minister and Colonel in the DPR's forces. Russian language. https://t.me/Slavyangrad ~ A few different pro-Russian people gather frequent content for this channel (~100 posts per day), some socialist, but all socially reactionary. If you can only tolerate using one Russian telegram channel, I would recommend this one. https://t.me/s/levigodman ~ Does daily update posts. https://t.me/patricklancasternewstoday ~ Patrick Lancaster's telegram channel. https://t.me/gonzowarr ~ A big Russian commentator. https://t.me/rybar ~ One of, if not the, biggest Russian telegram channels focussing on the war out there. Actually quite balanced, maybe even pessimistic about Russia. Produces interesting and useful maps. https://t.me/epoddubny ~ Russian language. https://t.me/boris_rozhin ~ Russian language. https://t.me/mod_russia_en ~ Russian Ministry of Defense. Does daily, if rather bland updates on the number of Ukrainians killed, etc. The figures appear to be approximately accurate; if you want, reduce all numbers by 25% as a 'propaganda tax', if you don't believe them. Does not cover everything, for obvious reasons, and virtually never details Russian losses. https://t.me/UkraineHumanRightsAbuses ~ Pro-Russian, documents abuses that Ukraine commits.
probably because there hasn't been even one iota of good news since the ceasefire. SAA just has been taking L after L after L and lying the whole time. Why should we expect the trend to change? SAA seems to be in total and complete collapse from the outside. They keep saying stuff to the contrary but I'm not seeing it on the ground. I'll stop dooming when they have even a single victory.
The SAA hasn't lied a single time. You're either conflating them with non official sources, or wrongfully judging them by out-of-date reports that were timely updated. Please show me where they lied if I'm wrong.
The SAA was not prepared to fight in Aleppo or any city for that matter, whereas the HTS was amping up for what seems to be a year. This does not mean that they wouldn't be prepared later
The SAA is no longer equipped to hold the entire geography of Syria in a state of war. I'll explain why below, but this is why withdrawing from Aleppo / Hama and not staying until the last fight is a right move. This would not mean that the SAA couldn't rebound. They have to work with their far more limited capability compared to 2017.
Below I will explain why the SAA is operating in very different conditions and can no longer follow the strategy you expect them to follow:
Most of SAA's government funding was diverted to reconstruction efforts (previously it was 80% of state budget for SAA).
overall headcount was greatly reduced because conscripts wanted to go home
experienced fighters are especially reduced (remember its a conscript army). Conscripts who fought in 2012-2018 are discharged
ally support greatly reduced. Hezbollah diverted to Israeli frontline, Russia to Ukraine (with Wagner et al. eliminated), and Iran struggling on its own.
All this to say is that the withdrawals from Hama and Aleppo are not indicative of a decisive loss. The SAA has rightfully recognized it needs to operate with a different strategy.
For now, they are draining the HTS forces before every retreat, while they consolidate. We don't know how things will go. It may very well end with Assad being defeated in a couple of days, but my point is that no one knows, and the performance in Hama and Aleppo is not indicative.
Because the situation is really bad. Even in August 2015 just before Russia intervened, the SAA still controlled a part of Aleppo, Hama, Daraa, As Suwayda, and Deir ez Zoir. The SAA control none of that now.
Syrian here, with dome context. Back then, the SAA was much larger in headcount, plus having additional headcount from hezbollah and Iran. This is no longer the case. The SAA is operating at less than 50% of that capacity. Their withdrawal from Hama et al. is strategic and not indicative of inability to defend in future frontlines. We cannot extrapolate 2012-2018 situation to today's.
Their withdrawal from Hama et al. is strategic and not indicative of inability to defend in future frontlines.
I certainly hope so, I just hope that the withdrawals would be more organised, every time the SAA withdraw they lose a lot of equipment. But that's easy for me to say on the other side of the world, I have no idea what it's like to fight in an actual war.
Back then, the SAA was much larger in headcount, plus having additional headcount from hezbollah and Iran.
Yeah without Hezbollah and Iran on the ground, fighting capacity is reduced with less troops on the ground. I'm guessing a lot of conscripts were sent home after 2018 as well. And Russia can't supply the same level of air support as they could from 2015-2018 because they're tied up in Ukraine.
Thank you for sharing your perspective and experience. Feel free to post and comment more. I hope that you stay safe and well, with whatever happens in your country.
I know the American Prestige guys aren't experts per se but Derek seems to think there's a lot that would need to be done for even the fall of Homs to translate to Assad being ousted. I guess total collapse is possible but it's a big area.
That's the opposite of what Derek is saying in his newsletter:
Events in Syria are moving farther and faster than they have at any time since insurgents swarmed into Aleppo city over the weekend, and the time remaining for Bashar al-Assad as Syrian president may be closer to hours than months or years. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and affiliated groups followed up their seizure of the city of Hama on Thursday with a rapid advance all the way to the outskirts of the city of Homs by Friday evening. They’ve obviously met little resistance from the Syrian military or the residents of the towns and villages they’ve swept through along the way, and it’s unclear how much of a fight they can expect in Homs. If they’re able to take that city—and there’s no reason at this point to think they can’t or won’t—the main question surrounding this offensive will shift (if it hasn’t already) from “how much longer can the insurgents keep this up?” to “when is Assad going to leave the country?” That’s assuming he hasn’t yet done so—very sketchy claims are circulating via social media that he’s already fled.
A rebel seizure of Homs would cut the main direct route between Damascus and the coastal northwestern provinces of Tartus and Latakia, which are home to Russian military bases and the Assad family’s main social support base. But it is not the only front on which the Syrian government is now foundering. To the east, the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces group took control of the city of Deir Ezzor on Friday, which is a huge development if one that is less immediately critical for Assad. Deir Ezzor was the Syrian government’s main hub in the eastern part of the country and its loss leaves the SDF in a much stronger position though it’s now facing heightened threats from Turkey-backed rebel groups. To the south, insurgent factions have been battling security forces in Daraa province and late Friday the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that they had taken control of the city of Daraa. The Jordanian government closed its only border crossing into Syria on Friday due to militant activity on the Syrian side.
The United Nations estimates that some 370,000 people have been displaced since the rebels began their offensive last Wednesday, and it’s warning of the risk that up to 1.5 million might eventually be displaced. This is happening so quickly that I’m sure there’s been no serious consideration given to humanitarian needs, and displacement camps are predominantly located in northern Syria, in territory controlled by the groups that many of these people are fleeing.
That 370,000 figure may not include the tens of thousands of predominantly Alawites who have fled Homs over the past day or so, according to the SOHR. Their flight highlights perhaps the biggest concern as HTS expands the territory under its control—namely, how this jihadist group, which has shed its ties to al-Qaeda but not necessarily its ideology or its intolerance for minority groups, aims to treat its new subjects. HTS appears to be going to some lengths to present an image of liberality and good governance in Aleppo as a demonstration of what it would do in the rest of the country, but that could well prove fleeting. As The Washington Post reported on Friday, Christians in Aleppo seem pleased with their treatment so far but are concerned that there may be another shoe that will drop once things quiet down. Much less has been reported about HTS’s intentions toward other groups, but the evacuation of Homs’ Alawite population suggests that community is deeply concerned.
If Damascus is cut off from the coast, how could that not be a major setback? I guess if allied support ever shows up it would change the equation but so far that hasn't really happened.
the main question surrounding this offensive will shift (if it hasn’t already) from “how much longer can the insurgents keep this up?” to “when is Assad going to leave the country?”
Yeah on the episode he was still thinking in terms of the first question, with the assumption they would need to regroup and plan their logistics before they could continue. Bad sign.
it's kursk/kherson all over again, people think russia and iran are going to give up their long term strategic interests and regional aspirations, throwing away of years of effort just because some jumped up proxies grabbed some land and are really loud on social media about it. might as well just roll over and if that was the case. imo this is just the americans throwing bibi a bone and we probably won't see any real reactions from the axis until after initial overtures from the trump admin. would be rash to make big moves just as biden's on the way out and potentially give someone as unpredictable as trump leverage without knowing more precisely how he plans on executing this time around.
I really wonder how the mega would've reacted to the Hong Kong riots. The doomers would've written some fanfic about how the riots would've led to the overthrow of the CPC while people who have basic knowledge about China would've known Mainlanders don't care about what a bunch of bratty Hong Kongers who think they're hot shit for being colonized by the British think.
What Kherson? The 2022 retreat where the Russian military themselves admitted they had to rebuild and regroup because they weren't going to win the war relying on just the LPR/DPR militias? You seriously need to refresh your memory on Kherson.
The entire Russian mil blog sphere shit on the MOD. The whole Surovikin line was only a thing later acknowledged to be good once everyone understood the war was going to be long and hard fought.
More importantly the Kherson retreat happened just right after Russia held the referendum for annexation. That is just a massive political L impossible to ignore.
Rather than supporting your point this does exactly the opposite, if the Russian MOD and Surovikin behaved like some people here even the thought of publicaly admitting defeat and retreating and rebuilding would be unacceptable. Its all sun and rainbows until it wasn't.
The Kusk offensive you're talking about Zelensky/NATO who accepted this delusional gamble for territory in exchange for negotiations because literaly nobody else believed this was anything but a desperate gamble.
As with always though the Russians should be criticized rightly for allowing it to happen. They have superiority in every metric its not excusable at all. Just like the Moscow attack was not excusable for Russian intelligence.
It wasn't any sort of master plan or bait by Russia, its just the reality that right now Ukraine couldn't be a serious threat due to their shortages. It is a mistake to assume things couldn't be different therefore it was not an issue.