Russia Pushes Long-Term Influence Operations Aimed at the U.S. and Europe

Draskla • 5 days ago

CredibleDefense Daily MegaThread August 30, 2023

[r/credibledefense]

A few recent articles on increased disinformation attempts (some excerpts):

Russia Pushes Long-Term Influence Operations Aimed at the U.S. and Europe

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/25/us/politics/russia-intelligence-propaganda.html

A newly declassified American intelligence analysis says Russian spy agencies are using influence laundering techniques to hide the Kremlin’s involvement in cultivating pro-Russia and anti-Ukraine messages.

But the information released by the United States on Friday is designed to show how much deeper Russian influence operations are than those efforts to sow dissent on the internet. Instead, the influence operations are focused on developing a network of young leaders who the Kremlin hopes will support Russia or spread pro-Russia messages in their home countries, efforts not unlike the Soviet Union’s spy agency’s work to develop ideological allies and informants around the world.

A U.S. official who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the newly released material described a group of so-called co-optees, who claim to be acting independently but in fact have been used by Russian intelligence agents to conduct influence operations against the United States. These operations include programs designed to build support for Russia among Americans and Europeans along with blunter efforts like fake grass-roots protests. The newly released material focuses on four Russians who have worked with Russian intelligence, including Natalia Burlinova, who was named in a Justice Department indictment that was unsealed this year.

Russia uses social media channels to exploit Niger coup

Moscow aiming to increase influence in Africa, winning lucrative contracts and gaining access to key resources

Content about Niger across 45 Russian Telegram channels affiliated with the Russian state or Wagner increased by 6,645% in the month after the coup, suggesting a keen interest in Moscow in exploiting the upheaval.

Logically detected only 11 pieces of content relating to Niger in the month before the coup, and 742 pieces of content since. The company identified a significant increase in the amount of content pushing anti-French narratives on these accounts, though it found that negative sentiments towards Paris in Niger, a former French colony, were already widespread before the coup.

The research will reinforce fears that Russia will seek to win influence, lucrative contracts and access to key resources in Niger after the overthrow of Bazoum.

Meta says it has disrupted a massive disinformation campaign linked to Chinese law enforcement

Meta identified a Chinese disinformation campaign on several social media platforms that generated positive news about China and criticized journalists, activists and the U.S.

Meta has disrupted the network on its own platforms and described it as the largest known operation of its kind in the world.

The network was linked to Chinese law enforcement by Meta researchers.

“Taken together, we assess Spamouflage to be the largest known cross-platform covert influence operation to date,” Meta said in its quarterly threat report. “Although the people behind this activity tried to conceal their identities and coordination, our investigation found links to individuals associated with Chinese law enforcement.”

Meta also identified and disrupted other operations and published a more detailed analysis of a Russian disinformation campaign it identified shortly after the beginning of the 2022 war in Ukraine.

The disruptions come ahead of what will likely be a contentious election cycle. Concerns over the role of influence campaigns in past elections led social media platforms, including Meta, to institute stricter guidelines on both the kind of political content allowed and the labels it adds to that content.

Influence campaigns have affected Meta users in the past, notably a Russia-backed campaign to inflame popular sentiment around the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

But this disinformation network, while prolific, was not effective, Meta cybersecurity executives said on a briefing call. The campaign’s pages collectively had more than 500,000 followers, most of which were inauthentic and from Bangladesh, Brazil and Vietnam.