Secure Operating Systems (Microkernels seems to be the future)
Secure Operating Systems (Microkernels seems to be the future)
I am not satisfied with Linux's security and have been researching alternative open source OS for privacy and security So far only thing that's ready to use is GrapheneOS (Based on Android) but that's not available on desktop (Though when Android release Desktop mode it may become viable)
Qubes OS is wrapper around underlying operating systems, so it doesn’t really fix for example Linux’s security holes it just kinda sandbox/virtualize them
OpenBSD is more secure than Linux on a base level but lack mitigations and patches that are added to linux overtime and it's security practices while good for it's time is outdated now
RedoxOS (Written in Rust) got some nice ideas but sticks to same outdated practices and doesn't break the wheel too much, and security doesn't seems to be main focus of OS
Haiku and Serenity are outright worse than Linux, especially Haiku as it's single user only
Serenity adopted Pledge and Unveil from OpenBSD but otherwise lacks basic security features
All new security paradigms seems to be happening in microkernels and these are the ones that caught my eyes
None of these are ready to be used as daily driver OS but in future (hopefully) it may change
Genode seems to be far ahead of game than everything else
Ironclad Written in ADA
Atmosphere And Mesosphere Open Source Re-implementation of Nintendo Switch's Horizon OS, I didn't expected this to be security-oriented but seems like Nintendo has done a very solid job
Then there are Managarm, HelenOS, Theseus but I couldn't figure out how secure they are
Finally there is Kicksecure from creators of Whonix, Kicksecure is a linux distro that plans to fix Linux's security problems
if you know of any other OS please share it here
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Daniel Micay is also no longer the head of GrapheneOS.
Then why is he the only one making any commits to this AOSP fork project on GitHub? You fell for his tricks too, like most.
Android devices in general are very good against security risks at this point, since Android 9/10 came. Android security continues to get solid across all devices at this point, with Android 14 release. Anything that is close to or stock is going to be very solid, and then it depends on competition evaluations like in BlackHat Pwn2Own every year. Pixel, Huawei/Honor, and Sony/Moto like stock phones tend to do very well, while Samsung, Xiaomi have issues due to lots of cruft and custom APIs they make in their skinned phones. Apple does well but iOS is insecure compared to Android.
I should clarify that sandboxed Google Play means practically nothing. You can use AppOps and neuter its permissions and achieve same effects of privacy and security on any non rooted phone, where only IP address and pings for Google certified SafetyNet device number is attained by Google, if you choose to use GMS.
Most of the security measures are something you can take with lots of Android devices, and is nothing exclusive to Pixel/Graphene fairy tales. Micay and his minions just love selling that combo as the only solution, and I frankly hate it as it has no basis in reality.
Edit: this is not drama. Please read the paper by Ken Thompson, co-creator of Unix and C, on why we should be able to trust the developer and NOT the code. https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~rdriley/487/papers/Thompson_1984_ReflectionsonTrustingTrust.pdf
This argument is going nowhere.
https://grapheneos.org/features lists features of GrapheneOS which differentiate it from AOSP. Are you claiming this is all fake?
Most of the security measures are something you can take with lots of Android devices, and is nothing exclusive to Pixel/Graphene fairy tales.
Is the Pixel 8 not the first device to support MTE? Is hardened_malloc pointless? And I literally listed 3 more features exclusive to GrapheneOS in my last comment.
Hardened_malloc function is in Linux kernel, and so it is part of every single Android device since years now.
MTE looks like some memory overflow protection, but that comes in the form of various functions. It is not a fancy thing limited to Pixels or Chromium browser. Memory protection is such a standard thing in software, I am not sure how MTE specifically is some form of USP. Also, let me tell you that all apps in Android basically run sandboxed, as far as memory goes, and now with SAF, even storage permissions are restricted by default.
I broke down Graphene features a year or so ago to someone. Here it is. https://i.imgur.com/pQHoq84.jpg
There are only 3 things they ever did on their own as extras, and even they have basically no value in the grand scheme of things, them being offering:
instead of 16 character, 64 character password limit on lockscreen PIN scrambling Morula method of exec spawning instead of Zygote method used in most AOSP projectsNow, I will elaborate on these 3.
Elaborating on first one, it is kind of useless as you can see for obvious reasons. For second one, you already understand why fingerprint avoids the issue of someone peeping at your PIN/password entered across your shoulder. Fingerprint is infinitely superior. Even more so with Android and iOS both offering biometric Lockdown features. This one is somewhat half credible, but the goal is to destroy the memory blocks used by an app after it is exited, so that memory blocks do not retain essential text strings of data to exploit. For this, you can just go to Developer Options and enable “Don’t keep activities” and it will achieve the same effect as Morula method of exec spawning implemented by GrapheneOS.So out of the 20-30 features GrapheneOS claims they developed, basically everything is either a modification of app permissions or firewalling or AOSP feature rebranding. You can do these things on any non rooted Android device.
Also, as you may have famously heard about “Sandboxed Play Services”, it is not developed by GrapheneOS, but a project called ProtonAOSP, whose developer is kdrag0n. GrapheneOS took that and rebranded it as their own developed thing.
I am not too interested in their buzzword self-circlejerking campaign after I observed this, in addition to the drama they invent via sockpuppets or otherwise to stay relevant in privacy communities.
hardened_malloc is a replacement for the libc function malloc. It is not part of Linux.
MTE is hardware-based, and is in fact restricted to Pixels currently (8+) AFAIK.
As I said in my first comment to you, do more research.
They are not much more than buzzwords, and I did my research. Nothing is "dealbreaker" about not using Pixel/Graphene, and it is perfectly okay to use other Androids with plenty security. They sell snake oil dreams and pretend theirs is the only solution, and that sounds dishonest. Not to mention, them lying in YouTube comment sections on how they bought $1M Israeli Cellebrite kits and Pixel/Graphene combo is immune to bootloader attacks.
I do not see the developer and his internet minions lying as a source of increasing trustworthiness in the project, not to mention their FUD and dogma dissemination cultist tactics that fool privacy seekers. They are not keen on improving or teaching security, but in fooling and scaring people for personal benefits.
They are not buzzwords. I do agree that the project and its members could improve in many ways, but this is unfortunately true for many security focused projects.
The ultimate result is not much more than buzzwords is what I mean. Memory security exists in Android to a great degree, and there are many protection mechanisms besides the obvious app sandboxing in general.
The project leader and his minions lie too much, refuse accountability, and this is not drama. It dissolves trust in any code they make or modify. The developer has to be morally trustworthy and honest first. If it was like a Linus being rude situation, it does not matter, because he is honest and his moral intent and heart is in good direction. Micay and "security" weirdos are the opposite in FOSS community.
You also made incorrect claims, bordering on lies honestly, as you didn't seem to be familiar with hardened_malloc and MTE at all, and then doubled-down and called them buzzwords and then deflected in this very comment by claiming you meant "the ultimate result is not much more than buzzwords". Then you proceeded to personally insult them.
Your behavior is much less extreme but not so different to the kind of behavior you're criticizing. But at least Daniel Micay and his "minions" are working very hard to enhance the security and user experience of their users, even if you believe their efforts amount to minor improvements at best. So why should I trust you over them?
Why should you trust me? Well, because I am not telling you to trust me. And I am only telling with hard evidence that they are working hard to harass, witch hunt critics, lie about everything, spread FUD and dogma that Pixel/Graphene is the only solution to world's problems. They are NOT working to make phone security more accessible, or to clear doubts, but to increase doubts and fear.
The reality is that you cherrypicked marketing nonsense, and 1 feature that firstly practically amounts to nothing, and secondly dismisses the immense risks of Google's proprietary security chip that brings with it a whole set of new issues that are directly related to security being verifiable and trustworthy. Apple's "security" chips have all been hacked to date, both the ones in iPhones and MacBooks, leaving permanent backdoors, and Pixel is going to be no different with a refusal to open source the chips.
It is not insult to insult people that insult everyone. It is facts. Calling a Nazi a Nazi for example would not be an insult. Micay and other clowns have harassed FlorisBoard and Bromite devs on GitHub trackers by falsely calling them "neonazis" and other things, just as example. They deserve not just scrutiny but a lot of bashing for the horrible things they do to FOSS community members and all kinds of people, and they will receive every single bit of it for dodging accountability.
