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  • I see no paradox here. Yes, the rubrics change over time, making morality relative, but the motivation (empathy) remains constant, meaning you can evaluate morality in absolute terms.

    A simple analog can be found in chess, an old game that’s fairly well-defined and well-understood compared to ethics. Beginners in chess are sometimes confused when they hear masters evaluate moves using absolute terms — e.g. “this move is more accurate than that move.

    Doesn’t that suggest a known optimum — i.e., the most accurate move? Of course it does, but we can’t actually know for sure what move is best until the game is near its end, because finding it is hard. Otherwise the “most accurate” move is never anything more than an educated guess made by the winningest minds/software of the day.

    As a result, modern analysis is especially good at picking apart historic games, because it’s only after seeing the better move that we can understand the weaknesses of the one we once thought was best.

    Ethical absolutism is similarly retrospective. Every paradigm ever proposed has flaws, but we absolutely can evaluate all of them comparatively by how well their outcomes express empathy. Let the kids cook.

    • To add to this, morality can be entirely subjective, but yeah, of course if I see someone kicking puppies in the street I'll think: "That's intrinsically morally wrong." Before I try to play in the space of "there's no true morality and their perspective is as valid as mine."

      If my subjective morality says that slavery is wrong, I don't care what yours says. If you try to keep slaves in the society I live in as well I want you kicked out and ostracized.

    • In moral philosophy cultural relativism isn't merely an empirical observation about how morality develops, though. It's a value judgment about moral soundness that posits that all forms of morality are sound in context.

      (When he says "entirely relative" that signals cultural relativism).

      To use your chess example a cultural relativist would hold buckle and thong to the argument that if most people in your chess club habitually play scholars mate and bongcloud then those are the soundest openings, full stop, and that you are objectively right to think that.

      Of course chess is a problematic analogy because there are proven known optimums, so tha analogy is biased on the side of objective morality.

      • Sorry for my delay. I’m with you, and it’s possible these undergrads could be considered cultural relativists.

        I suspect all they’re equipped to express is something like the prime directive from Star Trek due, potentially, to their knowledge of the troubled history of deploying foreign (e.g. colonial) mores in non-native contexts. If pressed, I wouldn’t expect any of them to truly support every moral schema without reservation.

        Of course chess is a problematic analogy because there are proven known optimums, so the analogy is biased on the side of objective morality.

        This confusion was my point, actually. The only proven optimums in chess relate to end game positions, as I mentioned above, due to computational complexity. For moves elsewhere in the game, such as openers, we have convincing anecdotal evidence of optimality, but we definitely cannot prove them without onerous assumptions about the opponent’s behavior.

        As a moral relativist myself, I’m obligated to point out that this prompts the question of what constitutes the end game in the moral context. That is, in what situation are the extended effects of any morally relevant action known to a given moral agent? If we can find an example, only then can we begin defining a truly objective moral construct.

        Until then, however, “convincing anecdotal evidence of optimality” must suffice, to the chagrin of moral absolutists everywhere.

        Edit: swype errors

  • For the people not getting it:

    1. They treat morals as opinions.
    2. They also treat their personal opinions like they're the absolute best opinion.

    Another way:

    They think everyone likes different ice cream flavors and that's fine. They like Rocky Road flavor. They also think anyone who doesn't is a monster.

    Convictions are one thing. But they need to be logically consistent. Saying morality is subjective but you're evil if you don't subscribe to my personal version is illogical.

    • Let's say we decide that morals what is right and wrong is decided entirely by ourselves. Then it makes perfect sense to defend your own opinions and to disagree with people who disagree with your stance on right and wrong. You chose those morals after all. It's kinda part of the deal that they can't apply to you alone (example: when is it just to kill?)

      So I don't see a contradiction.

      I guess this post is about Inability to engage with a different set of morals. But assuming that their is an absolute truth for right and wrong wouldn't solve that issue, so I'm not sure why they brought it up.

      • The issue is believing that everyone has a right to their beliefs but then attacking them. It's like in cultural anthropology: you should only judge a culture by its own internal morals and standards and not impose your outside view when studying them. Kinda like Star Trek Prime Directive.

        If you TRULY believe everyone is entitled to their own morals, then you're breaking that when you criticize someone else's. After all, they have their own morals system and you're perfectly fine with that. Your morals can only include your actions. If you believe that your morals are objectively the best, you're no longer thinking the first thing anymore. It's subjectivism vs objectivism.

220 comments